[dm-crypt] Avoiding fsck.ext4 destruction of crypto_luks data
rz at linux-m68k.org
Mon Dec 31 13:40:36 CET 2012
On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 11:59:56AM -0500, Emily Williams wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 10:04 AM, Arno Wagner <arno at wagner.name> wrote:
> > > I wonder how fsck checks for a superblock. I still assume, that chances
> > of
> > > having encrypted data in the right block on disk looking like a correct
> > > ext-superblock is next to zero.
> > The ext2 superblock magic number seems to be 0xEF53. That is a bit
> > short but still only gives something like 1 in 65536 probability of
> > misdetection in encrypted data. I think we can rule that out
> > for the moment.
> That actually seems like a pretty big chance to me. esp. if a hard drive
> manufacturer happens to have shipped a hard drive model where each hard
> drive has this problem.
fsck will not blindly trust a random superblock signature. All values inside
the superblock are checked if they are plausible. It will scream loudly if
superblock is screwed. The chance it will accept a random sector as valid
superblock is very very close to zero.
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