[dm-crypt] LUKS backup headers for recovery
arno at wagner.name
Thu Jul 19 21:18:22 CEST 2012
On Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 11:36:53AM -0700, Two Spirit wrote:
> Hello world,
> I'm a heavy believer in the backup mantra "2 is 1 and 1 is none", and start
> to feel comfortable when I have 3. Luckily I had backups to handle my
> recent data loss with LUKS, but I had to suffer a long restore time as the
> capacities get larger.
> Are there backup headers/superblocks/metadata (whatever you call it) within
> the LUKS container so that if the header
> is somehow corrupt, I can utilize the backup copy from within the container
> like file systems have.
Not at this time. It is a wish-list item for the future, but its
secuurity-implications are not quite clear at this time. For example,
it compromises the easy way to wipe the header that you have at
> (I understand there is still a question
> of pre-decryption / post decryption.
Not really. The problem is more that the header is relatively
large and that the second copy decreases the anti-forensic properties.
Just copying th existing header may not be the right approach.
> Since these are usually long running
> file servers, I've found lots of discussions about passphrase recovery
> while the systems are still running and not luksClosed). I did google
> around for LUKS recovery procedures, but there were lots of bad long
> involved processes out there that didn't work or I couldn't get to work.
> I now see the luksHeaderBackup and luksHeaderRestore commands.(My excuse
> is that I don't recall them when I first learned about cryptsetup many
> years ago.)
They are also explained in the FAQ, with a special warning
right at the beginning. Reading documentation from time to
time can decrease your risk and effort.
> but it sounds like I have (or some sysadmin has) to make my own
> backups of this information else if I don't, I'm screwed if I get
> corruption in the LUKS header so it is almost a mandatory procedure --
> something I think lot of people would also not have done.
Not quite. First you have to decide about the security trade-off.
And then, if you want, you can make a header-backup. Or not.
> Yes, I have seen a seasoned sysadmin run #rm -rf * from root on a
> production server, so I could forsee someone doing something to
> mess up the LUKS headers.
It happens, as the mailing-list archives show. But the protection
against that and other things is the data backup, not a header
backup. The header backup is something convenient that decreases
security and as such should not be there by default.
"Those that sacrifice security for convenience shall neither
have security nor convenience", so to say.
The thing is that the header backup does not replace a normal
backup you need anyways. And a header-backup to the same device
does not protect you against a disk failure. There really is no
good way to do this except to explain the issue to the user
and have them decide what they want to do.
Encryption is not something you can do without understanding
what you do. And until you understand what you do, there will
occasionaly be things that would have been easy with the
required knowlegde but are hard without it. But you did it
right, it just took a long time to restore, you did not
permanently lose you data.
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno at wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty
are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled
with doubt and indecision. -- Bertrand Russell
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