[dm-crypt] nuke password to delete luks header
jonas at freesources.org
Fri Jan 17 15:32:20 CET 2014
Am 17.01.2014 14:12, schrieb Arno Wagner:
> On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 13:43:42 CET, Jonas Meurer wrote:
>> Am 16.01.2014 21:18, schrieb Matthias Schniedermeyer:
>>> Meanwhile increasing the risk of everybody else, because once that
>>> feature is a documented part of the system everybody will assume that
>>> everybody will use it. Good look defending against a "Destruction of
>>> Evidence" accusation, in case that happens in a situation with a LEO.
>>> In short:
>>> The documented existence of such a feature is a risk by itself.
>> Same logic applied, even the existence of this discussion is a risk by
>> itself. It proves that people might use a patched cryptsetup with added
>> nuke feature already.
> Yes, it is. That is one of the reasons why I strongly recommend
> not taking ecrypted data into danger at all and making sure all
> unused space on storage media is zeroed.
While in general I agree to your suggestion, Matthias' point rather
seems like a non-argument to me.
I agree that one should consider possible negative implications of wrong
usage of the feature in question. But I don't agree that the risk
created by "documented existance of such a feature" is an argument
against implementing it. Same logic applied again, we should stop
shipping crypto software in distributions at all just because in some
countries it might bring you into trouble, right?
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