[dm-crypt] LUKS disk encryption with remote boot authentication
sven at whgl.uni-frankfurt.de
Mon Oct 20 12:09:32 CEST 2014
On Mon, October 20, 2014 00:10, Arno Wagner wrote:
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2014 at 22:59:21 CEST, Cpp wrote:
>> On 10/19/14, Arno Wagner <arno at wagner.name> wrote:
>> > Actually, it has a pretty good chance of working well. Once.
>> > And if it is not too obvious and nowhere documented that the
>> > attacker can get at beforehand.
>> So basically if a device like this is meant to be used and distributed
>> widely, one security requirement would be that each and every device
>> uses a custom anti-tampering circuitry setup so that no two setups are
>> identical. After one device has been compromised, a new custom setup
>> has to be made, possibly at a new location.
> For DIY, yes. Commercial HSMs have another protection, namely
> they are priced at EUR 50k+. That discourages most attackers from
> buying a few to leant how to break into them.
Would an attacker really spent 50k+ or would he/she spend 10% of that to
break into the company building the HSM? Or even less pricier, break
'into' one or more employees?
> But seriously, this is not a beginner's game. If you want to
> keep out a low-resource attacker, just get a safe, drill some
> holes for the cables, add an arduino or compatible with light,
> vibration and orientation sensors and make it protect the
> passphrase and pull the plug if it finds something fishy.
> Attachment to computer via serial or USB as HID is fine.
> Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno at wagner.name
> GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D
> A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato
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