[dm-crypt] The future of disk encryption with LUKS2

Arno Wagner arno at wagner.name
Mon Feb 8 00:17:50 CET 2016


I see your problem. The more simple solution would be to
default to a header copy at the end (people being careless),
but to allow to explicitely disable/endable it on creation 
and later. In fact, I am very much for adding these options.

You and (likely) I would run with single headers, but looking 
at the history of this list, that default backup header would 
have helped quite a few people.

Would be a single flag in the header and a check for the
second header if the first one is damaged. Use of that
second header should require answering a safety question with 
YES or giving a --force option or the like. Would also need
an option to update container size to the size of the underlying
block-device (as it does now automatically on mapping).

Regards,
Arno


On Sun, Feb 07, 2016 at 08:09:58 CET, f-dm-c at media.mit.edu wrote:
> This discussion of multiple headers wrt resizing seems to be
> overcomplicating the issue, while potentially breaking LUKS
> for my use case.
> 
> First, overcomplicating:
> 
> Putting a backup header at the very end of the device, as we've seen,
> requires all sorts of gymnastics to ensure that the right things
> happen with updates and resizes.  But what are we really trying to
> fix here?  Accidental header smashes?  In that case, might I suggest
> something much simpler:
> 
> (a) If the underlying container is smaller than some figure (100 meg?),
> just use a single header.  You could back up -the whole container-
> in seconds, much less the header.
> 
> (b) If it's bigger, put a second header maybe 1 meg after the first
> header, and start the encrypted container after that second header.
> 
> The idea here is to allow tiny containers for those cases which make
> sense (if there are any), without chewing up several extra meg for a
> backup header.  But if the container is larger than (say) 100 meg, the
> extra space rapidly becomes completely negligible.  We don't have to
> put the header at the end of the device---just keeping it several meg
> away from things that are likely to smash it is fine.  (Something that
> decides to eat 10's of meg into your filesystem is rare and will turn
> the FS to swiss cheese anyway and you're going to have to go back to
> your backups at that point, most likely.)
> 
> This doesn't solve the how-to-update-correctly problem (since we're
> still talking two or more headers), but it -does- mean that enlarging
> the partition -does not- require relocating a backup header!  This,
> in turn, means no pressure to remove the ability to resize (most
> especially, to -grow-) the container, which is very important to my
> use case.
> 
> My use case:
> 
> I crucially depend on LUKS being able to grow to a larger container
> -without having to throw away the existing filesystem-.  Why?  Because
> one of my most-important use cases is a giant encrypted filesystem
> which holds dirvish vaults.  These vaults are -very- extensively
> hardlinked, not only forwards and backwards in time, but also sideways
> across vaults, because I run faster-dupemerge across them to squeeze
> out identical copies of files from similar hosts and from movement of
> files from one host to another.
> 
> For example, I'm looking at one FS right now with 8 TB in it,
> consisting of about 845 million inodes, with a huge number of
> those reflecting files with tens of hardlinks or more.
> 
> This FS is built on top of LUKS, on top of LVM, on top of RAID.
> I have enlarged it by either migrating to larger disks, or by
> adding disks and adding LV's, then growing LUKS to cover them
> (which it does automatically, since it resizes itself to the
> size of the underlying device), and then growing the filesystem.
> [I can do this online, since the filesystem is ext4.]
> 
> Because there are so many hardlinks and the filesystem is so large, it
> is NOT POSSIBLE to copy this filesystem at the file level to another
> device.  I can point at previous discussions from years ago on other
> lists detailing the difficulties, but here's an outline:  Neither
> rsync nor tar nor cpio can walk the entire filesystem without eating
> enormous quantities of RAM, which cannot physically fit in the
> machine, which means enormous paging, which means runtime of months
> if not years.  It is also infeasible to move the filesystem in slices,
> because that would break all the hardlinks between the shards, and
> recomputing them is both computationally expensive -and- would alter
> directory write times in undesireable ways.
> 
> When I have migrated this FS to different hardware in the past, I've
> either done a block-level copy with dd (after dismounting it, of
> course), or swapped RAID devices underneath it, And then, if I'm going
> to larger disks (the primary reason for moving it, especially before
> it was also a RAID), I've resized, including resizing the LUKS layer,
> of course.
> 
> If LUKS lost the ability to resize in place, LUKS would become useless
> to me for this workload.  "You should copy it elsewhere and redo LUKS
> and then copy back" is simply a nonstarter.  At the very best, that
> would mean a block-level copy of the whole thing, recreation of LUKS,
> and copy back, using either dd or playing RAID games, while the entire
> FS was down.  That's several days.  But the current scheme, where LUKS
> can resize in place, means I can (if I have to) back up the filesystem
> via RAID (e.g., add disks, sync, remove) while it's still up, then
> resize, and see no downtime at all.
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-- 
Arno Wagner,     Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,    Email: arno at wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718  FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF  B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
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