[dm-crypt] [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow file systems to selectively bypass dm-crypt
arno at wagner.name
Fri Jun 16 20:35:17 CEST 2017
On Fri, Jun 16, 2017 at 16:47:15 CEST, Michael Kjörling wrote:
> On 16 Jun 2017 16:31 +0200, from arno at wagner.name (Arno Wagner):
> And of course, for those who use FDE to facilitate storage device
> decommissioning (just throw away the key and the data is effectively
> unreadable), the _knowledge_ that _all_ data that touches the storage
> device is encrypted before it does might even be the whole _point_ of
> using FDE.
That may actually be critical in an enterprise-scenario.
As in "do not use anything that does not have this property",
enforced by a policy.
> But I'm preaching to the choir, here. Or at least I hope I am.
You are. I think this whole thing is just another instance of
some crypto-novices to "improve" things. They usually do not
understand what the crypto actually assures and how easily that
can be broken. The only thing to do is (once again) explain
why this is a bad idea.
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno at wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato
If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
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