[dm-crypt] Efficacy of xts over 1TB
mbroz at redhat.com
Sun Jul 25 14:25:32 CEST 2010
On 07/25/2010 12:34 PM, Arno Wagner wrote:
> This would be a reason to stay away from XTS, something may have
> been subtly messed up.
> As a side note, the XTS spec seems to be behind a IEEE paywall, which
> would be another reason not to use it, public standards need to be
> accessible for free.
You should then suggest not use hardisks and storage technologies too
because most of standards are not accesible for free:-)
Seriously, XTS-AES is FIPS140-2 approved and I see no problem to use it.
Yes, final version is not available but draft specification is still there
(this is IEEE business, not hiding algorithm definition IMHO).
Just please note one thing, which is dm-crypt special here:
default "plain IV" is 32 bit only, so if anyone uses it on >2TB partition
some sectors shares IV (IV generator restarts, opening it to to watermarking
and similar attacks).
Please _always_ use plain64 (*aes-xts-plain64*) if you want use it for large
devices. (plain64 produces the same IV for <2TB.
Available since 2.6.33, Truecrypt 7 already does that, thanks:-)
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