[dm-crypt] The future of disk encryption with LUKS2

Arno Wagner arno at wagner.name
Fri Feb 5 20:53:44 CET 2016

On Fri, Feb 05, 2016 at 17:50:14 CET, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On ven., 2016-02-05 at 16:24 +0100, Arno Wagner wrote:
> > Then why are you asking about integrity protection on a list
> > dedicated to a block-layer encryption system? That does not make
> > any sense. If you state things that do not make sense then I
> > will point that out, because there is a real possibility that
> > your reasoning process (I am not implying there was none) was 
> > flawed. 

> Because integrity protection *does* make sense on block layer encryption?
> The fact that you don't have a 1:1 mapping is indeed an issue, and that's
> why I was asking in the context of the LUKS2 thread (where supposedly new
> ideas could be thrown), because solving the involved challenges would be
> useful in the context of dm-crypt.  I think.  You could store all ICV in a
> specific place in the block device, or have one block of ICVs every once
> in a while, or something else.  It'd involve some clever calculation
> indeed but it might be doable.
> But I can perfectly understand if it's not something which interest
> developers here, and I can perfectly take “no” as an answer :)

Well, as they plan to *experiment* with it anyways (and I assume
"they" will be the dm-crypt people), we will see how viable it is.	

> > > > And second, who says anything abot the "evil maid" changing
> > > > things in the encrypted container?
> > > 
> > > I'm not following you here.
> > 
> > Attacks on hardware, replacement of the disk with something that
> > attacks the boot process, Firewire, USB, etc. vulnerabilities, 
> > changes in non-encrypted areas, etc.

> This is about your external disk drive or usb where you put data on it.
> This is not about boot integrity or something, really.

I am well aware of that. Have a look at what types of "evil maid"
attacks are possible today. If somebody competent had access to 
your storage device, chances are they will be able to successfully 
attack the next machine you plug it into. Sure, may be expensive,
may take hardware modification, but do not think just because it 
is "only" a storage device it is always safe to plug it into a 

Arno Wagner,     Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,    Email: arno at wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718  FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF  B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato

If it's in the news, don't worry about it.  The very definition of 
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier

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