[dm-crypt] About CVE-2016-4484: - Cryptsetup Initrd root Shell

Arno Wagner arno at wagner.name
Tue Nov 15 14:27:57 CET 2016

Interesting. Does not very seem relevant, except in special
situations, where an attacker can boot the system and can
access the console, but cannot change the boot-process 
or boot image itself.

This would immediately exclude any normal PC
from consideration, because there, if you can boot,
you can also boot something else which gives you the
same capabilities (or better) than this exploit.
If you can get BIOS access, the same might be possible, 
so servers with ILO should also not be affected.

My take would be that of this vulnerabilituy allowas
an attack, then the security model used is broken in 
the first place. Of course, there are environments that
need two (or more) effective security mechanisms, so 
fixing this is a good idea, but (almost) nobody needs
to be very concerned about it.


On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 13:34:49 CET, Milan Broz wrote:
> Hi all,
> just little bit clarification about CVE-2016-4484
> http://hmarco.org/bugs/CVE-2016-4484/CVE-2016-4484_cryptsetup_initrd_shell.html
> This bug is *NOT* cryptsetup/LUKS upstream bug, it is a minor problem in scripts
> unlocking an encrypted system.
> It allows attacker to drop to initramdisk shell (without decryption of LUKS data).
> The scripts are part of Debian cryptsetup package (as an addition to upstream)
> or part of dracut package (if dracut is used).
> (The info about the problem was embargoed until the talk and only Debian maintainers
> were informed in advance.)
> Milan
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Arno Wagner,     Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,    Email: arno at wagner.name
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