[dm-crypt] LUKS header recovery attempt, bruteforce detection of AF-keyslot bit errors
gmazyland at gmail.com
Tue Apr 25 18:30:00 CEST 2017
On 04/25/2017 06:16 PM, Sven Eschenberg wrote:
> Furthermore, everyone who had access to /dev/mem and was able to locate
> the keys knows, them. On second thought, this holds certainly true for
> the 'new central kernel key storage' (Forgot the name), depending on the
> allover kernel configuration and userspace, that is.
> At the end of the day dm-crypt (etc.) needs to store the key somewhere,
> where it can be accessed at all times when an IO-Request comes in. There
> is not that many options for that ;-).
Crypto API stores the key in memory as well (even the round keys etc), obviously.
We have already support for kernel keyring in dm-crypt (so the key will
not be directly visible in dmsetup table), this will be supported in next major
version of cryptsetup/LUKS.
But as you said, if you have access to the kernel memory, it is there anyway...
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